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Abstract 
Recognition, or the lack of it, is a central concern in International Relations (IR). However, 
how states cope with international misrecognition has so far not been thoroughly explored in 
IR scholarship. To address this, the article presents a theoretical framework for understanding 
international misrecognition by drawing on discursive and psychoanalytical theories of 
collective identity formation and humour studies. The article conceptualises international 
misrecognition as a gap between the dominant narrative of a national Self and the way this 
national Self is reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the international Other. We argue that humour 
offers an important way of coping with misrecognition by ridiculing and thereby 
downplaying international criticism. The significance for international relations is illustrated 
through an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign, ‘Presenting Israel’, which, through 
parodying video clips, mobilised ordinary Israeli citizens to engage in peer-to-peer public 
diplomacy to explain Israel when traveling abroad. Public diplomacy campaigns are 
commonly seen by scholars and practitioners as attempts to improve the nation’s image and 
smoothen or normalise international Self/Other relations. However, after analysing the 
discursive and visual components of the campaign – which parodied how European media 
portrayed Israel as primitive, violent and exotic – this article observes that in the context of 
international misrecognition, such coping attempts can actually contribute to further 
international estrangement. 
  
Keywords: Humour, Israel, Misrecognition, National identity, Public diplomacy  
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Introduction 
‘This is the camel. The camel is the typical Israeli animal used by the Israelis to travel 
from place to place in the desert where they live. It is the means of transport for water, 
merchandise and ammunition. It is even used by the Israeli cavalry’ (Masbirim’s 
channel, 2010a). 
 
 With these words, a British TV reporter, dressed in khaki, depicts Israel, as he is 
walking past a caravan of camels in a desert. However, the reporter is not starring in an actual 
documentary film, but in a satirical video clip. One that was produced in 2010 by the newly 
established Israeli Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs (MPDDA). As part of 
the campaign ‘Presenting Israel’, the objective of the video was to mobilise ordinary Israeli 
citizens travelling abroad to become citizen diplomats. An accompanying campaign website 
coached citizens how to counter foreign myths and portray Israel as a modern, sophisticated 
and peace-loving state. The campaign was part of a series of initiatives meant to improve 
Israel’s global image, which according to many indications had hit rock bottom. 1 Israeli 
officials promoting the campaign argued that despite the humorous tone, ‘Presenting Israel’ 
was responding to an actual threat to Israel’s image, as foreigners ‘paint a picture so different 
from the reality in the eyes of Israelis, and with such little regard for their point of view’ 
(Seaman, 2010).  
 The campaign was widely contested within Israel and abroad. Israeli media and 
academics criticised the campaign for being ‘ridiculous’ and for neglecting the link between 
international criticism and Israel’s ongoing policies, such as the military occupation of the 
West Bank and the ‘separation wall’ (Bronner, 2010; Caspi, 2010; Haaretz, 2010). Foreign 
reporters were also offended for being portrayed as ‘stupid’ and ‘gullible’ (Rabinovsky, 
2010). Nonetheless, according to the MPDDA, the campaign was a great success, seen by 86 
per cent of Israeli survey respondents as an ‘effective call to action’ (Attias, 2012: 477). 
Between 2010-2012, over three million users visited the campaign website, hundreds of 
advocacy coaching sessions were provided to delegations, and over 100,000 advocacy pocket 
                                                
1 According to EU’s 2003 Eurobarometer, Israel was perceived in Europe as the biggest threat to peace in the 
world (EC, 2003: 78) and the Anholt Nation Brands Index - Q3 Report (2006) estimated Israel to be the worst 
brand overall.  
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guides were distributed at the national airport (Attias, 2012: 478-9). The conception of a 
growing gap between the image that many Israelis have of their country and the way the 
world sees it has become increasingly central to Israel’s foreign policy, and in recent years, it 
has ignited a plethora of public-private advocacy partnerships, attempting to mediate Israel’s 
growing sense of international estrangement. 
 To understand the campaign – and more broadly how states struggle for international 
recognition – this article explores the phenomenon of misrecognition in international 
relations. To do so, we need to go beyond the binary distinction between recognition and 
non-recognition that is so prominent in IR theory. Drawing on insights from poststructuralist 
discourse analysis and concepts from psychoanalytic social theory, we argue that articulating 
a discourse of a coherent national Self requires recognition in the ‘mirror’ of international 
Others. This always entails the possibility of misrecognition, arising from the gap between 
domestic discourses of the national Self and the way in which Others understand and 
represent this Self. As identities are inherently unstable and incomplete, the reflection in the 
‘international mirror’ will always disappoint. Misrecognition is thus inherent in any process 
of identification. However, once a specific sense of misrecognition is articulated into a 
collective discourse – for instance through international condemnation and criticism – it 
opens up new terrains for international politics. 
 Humour, we argue, plays a key role in handling misrecognition. Psychoanalytical 
theorists, perhaps most prominently Sigmund Freud, argued that joking not only helps release 
tensions; it can also create a sense of superiority. Developing this insight for the study of 
international relations, we argue in the second part of the article that humour is not merely a 
distraction from the serious problems of foreign policy and security; humour is an important 
social mechanism through which states discursively process and negotiate sensitive issues in 
international relations. State leaders joke about difficult conflicts and ambiguous problems. 
For example, when Denmark faced global criticism over the publication of the Muhammed 
Cartoons (Hansen, 2011), hostile reactions from Muslim voices were portrayed as aberrant to 
democracy and it was suggested that ‘Muslims should get a sense of humour’ (Rolfe, 2009: 
262). While rarely taken seriously in IR theory, humour is intrinsic to the very conduct of 
international relations. And as this article will illustrate, humour can, when used in public 
diplomacy campaigns, be a powerful tool to handle international misrecognition and 
consolidate a discourse of common identification against international and domestic Others. 
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 The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, we suggest that misrecognition, 
as a discourse, is central to international identity politics. In the second part, we argue that 
public diplomacy represents attempts to reconfirm and stabilise a fragile and contested 
national identity, and we draw on theories of humour to show how states use humour to 
handle misrecognition. We then turn to the case of Israel in part three, providing a brief 
analysis of the dominant national identity markers in Israel and the way in which global 
criticism has helped create a discourse of international misrecognition, which has come to 
play an increasingly central role in Israeli foreign policy and public diplomacy. In the fourth 
and final part of the article, we apply our theoretical arguments in an analysis of the public 
diplomacy campaign ‘Presenting Israel’, demonstrating how humour, visuals and discourse 
interact to reiterate dominant identity markers and marginalise alternative visions of Israel. 
We conclude that rather than improving Israel’s image abroad, such public diplomacy 
attempts to mediate international misrecognition are likely to deepen Israel’s international 
estrangement. The article shows how a focus on misrecognition and humour provides key 
insights into how international relations work and how national identities are maintained and 
resisted. 
 
Recognition, misrecognition and national identity politics 
 International recognition, or the lack of it, is central to IR theory. As its most 
fundamental political unit – the sovereign state – is a relational entity, it can only exist if 
recognised by other sovereign states (e.g. Anghie, 2007; Ringmar, 2014). With the 
emergence of the European territorial state and the so-called Westphalian system, 
membership of the international society and its laws required formal recognition of 
sovereignty by other sovereign states (Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Krasner, 1995). Further 
developed in the context of colonialism through the reciprocal recognition of the European 
states and the denial of recognition from the non-European Others (Anghie, 2007), ‘[i]t was 
through practices of recognition, affirming sameness, and through practices of non-
recognition, affirming difference, that international society came to constitute itself as such’ 
(Ringmar, 2014: 447). From this perspective, recognition becomes an either/or question: 
Either the state is recognised as a sovereign state or it is not. Yet, this conceptual dichotomy 
between recognition and non-recognition is challenged the moment we move from formal 
recognition of sovereignty in international law to identity and moral politics, as the recent 
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surge of interest in recognition within IR theory testifies (e.g. Agné et al., 2013; Burns and 
Thompson, 2013; Daase et al., 2015; Greenhill, 2008; Gustafsson, 2016; Lindemann and 
Ringmar, 2014). For example, while Israel’s sovereignty is internationally established, the 
recognition of its national identity narratives is much less stable and frequently challenged 
not only by its traditional enemies but also by friendlier nations (see Adler 2013).  
 Embedded in colonial heritage, dynamics of recognition and misrecognition occur in a 
discursive space where states articulate themselves and others as part of a certain moral 
community. This discourse of belonging to a community differentiates states from one 
another, expressing a structural bias or hierarchy. Whereas much postcolonial critique 
focuses on non-recognition by the West or Europe, this bias also applies to those recognised 
as belonging to (or sitting on the fault line) of a Western/European community. At the 
Jerusalem Post diplomatic conference in 2014, the Danish Ambassador to Israel explained the 
consequences of this structural bias for Israel: ‘there is the allegation that Europe is applying 
double standards [when criticizing Israel] This is because you are one of us’. Accordingly, 
the ambassador continued, while Israelis may say ‘“look what is going on in Syria, look at 
what is going on elsewhere”, those are not the standards that you are being judged by, 
[instead we] put you to the same standards as all the rest of the countries in the European 
context’ (Jposttv 2014). Israel is thereby interpellated as a member (or a borderline member) 
of a superior European community, differentiated from the Arab/Muslim Other.2 Yet, as 
Israel’s former Prime Minister Yitshak Shamir remarked about Europeans: ‘They don’t […] 
understand us’ (Shamir quoted in Del Sarto, 2006: 106). For Shamir, the problem was not a 
lack of formal recognition or non-recognition, but misrecognition. 
Within IR theory, it has been suggested to distinguish between thin and thick concepts 
of recognition: Thin recognition refers to the legal status of a sovereign state while thick 
recognition refers to the recognition of specific identity narratives of an individual, group or 
indeed state (Strömbom, 2014). Thick recognition has largely been addressed through social 
identity theory, which stresses people’s ontological needs – that humans need a particular 
Other’s confirmation of their identity ‘lest they feel insecure about who they really are’ 
(Wolf, 2011). Or put more radically, ‘unless we are recognised, we have no social identity’ 
                                                
2 The 2006 Anholt Nation Brands Index illustrates the exclusion: While it reports that Israel has the worst 
overall national brand, apart from Egypt, none of Israel’s neighbouring countries are even considered as 
‘brands’. 
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(Ringmar, 2014: 8). Applying this position to international relations, states are perceived 
metaphorically as people that need their national identity confirmed by other states. If this 
confirmation is denied, this is seen to be ‘traumatic’ (Ringmar, 2014: 7; see also Mitzen, 
2006; Ringmar, 2002). As Ned Lebow (2008) puts it, drawing on Hegel, there is a need of 
‘Others’ for recognition and inclusion. In this sense, misrecognition is ‘the feeling of […] the 
negative difference between a claimed self-image and the image given to us by others’ 
(Lindemann, 2014: 543). Accordingly, a state’s actions are driven by attempts to close this 
gap and stabilise the Self in order to gain ontological security (Mitzen, 2006), and this is 
ultimately what Ringmar (2014) calls international recognition games.  
 In a similar vein, yet drawing more on political theories of justice, fairness and 
entitlement, others see misrecognition not as much as an ontological concern but rather as ‘a 
failure to recognise the status of the Other as a “moral equal of a person”’ (Pilapil, quoted in 
Martineau et al., 2012: 4). For Wolf (2011), for example, recognition is not really a question 
of identity confirmation, as states do sometimes know who they are. Instead, it is when they 
feel unfairly treated – or misrecognised – that they insist on getting the treatment they feel 
entitled to. States may even start conflicts in order to get the recognition they feel they 
deserve. However, more peaceful ways of handling misrecognition are also possible. 
Drawing on Aristotle and Heidegger, Berenskoetter (2007) contends that the friend as the 
‘significant Other’ is capable, even at the international level, of reducing anxiety and pave the 
way for recognition.   
 Despite differences, these accounts conceptualise states as having ‘feelings’ and 
‘needs’. Yet, the problem is not just anthropomorphism - i.e. that ‘states are people too’ 
(Wendt, 2004; see also Epstein, 2011: 344), and the downplaying of the gap between 
dynamics at the individual and collective level, but the essentialist assumption that the 
national Self as such can become more or less stable – that the gap between a state’s self-
perception and how it is seen internationally can be bridged (Bartelson, 2013: 112).  
 In the next section, we propose a different take on recognition that draws on a 
poststructuralist understanding of national identity and a psychoanalytical conceptualisation 
of misrecognition. We argue, unlike the predominant recognition theories in IR, that the 
ability to close the gap between the national Self and the image reflected by the international 
Other is impossible. Instead, what becomes politically salient is the process through which a 
multitude of diverse and ambiguous individual experiences are articulated into a public 
discourse of misrecognition through textual and visual representations. We will thus not 
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focus on how Israel – or its leaders or citizens – really feel, but on how international 
misrecognition as a discursive construct affects Israeli public diplomacy and foreign policy. 
 
National identity, misrecognition, and the international Other  
 To understand how identity becomes internationally misrecognised requires first a 
clarification of national identity. In poststructuralist IR theory, national identity is a public 
discourse that arises around predominant identity markers of a collective Self, and as all 
discursive formations, it is characterised by instability and fragility. From this perspective, 
foreign policy and public diplomacy as a sub-phenomenon of foreign policy are interwoven 
with the constitution and performance of national identities (Campbell, 1993; Neumann, 
1998; Wæver, 2002; Hansen, 2006). This is because ‘foreign policies rely upon 
representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that 
identities are produced and reproduced’ (Hansen, 2006: 1). By differentiating between 
juxtaposed representations (Wæver, 2002: 24), ‘foreign policy discourse always articulates a 
Self and a series of Others’, since ‘identity is always given through reference to something it 
is not’ (Hansen, 2006: 6). Here, Self/Other relations are placed at the core of foreign policy 
analysis (Campbell, 1993), since international relations as such basically represent the 
relations between estranged groups of Self and Others (Der Derian, 1987; Neumann, 1998). 
From this perspective, the ethical task is to find ways to maintain identity without Othering – 
or at least by creating less radical degrees of Otherness (e.g. Campbell, 1993).  
We believe that psychoanalytical social theory provides a key to understanding the 
specificity of misrecognition in foreign policy discourses. Indeed, psychoanalytical social 
theory is often associated with various forms of poststructuralism. Ontologically both focus 
on the role of language in the discursive construction of identity. However, Lacan’s major 
contribution to poststructuralism is through his introduction of the Freudian unconscious, i.e. 
as the element of subjectivity that has not and often cannot be articulated into language, and 
thus is resistant to discursive ordering (see Edkins, 1999). This un-signified residue, however, 
has political significance, since it serves as the source of the human desire for identification. 
In this way, it can contribute to the exploration of identity politics (see Jones and Spicer, 
2005; Mouffe 2009) and particularly to the understanding of misrecognition.  
 As Lacan suggests in his mirror stage thesis, misrecognition (méconnaissance) is 
central to identity formation. Lacan argues that humans are born lacking the ability to 
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communicate and thus differentiate themselves from the world. Mimicry therefore plays a 
central role in the development of a child. As the infant begins to recognise her or his own 
reflection in the mirror and identify with it, in this process, by differentiating him- or herself 
from the world, the infant develops a conscious sense of Self, i.e. ego. However, this 
identification with the mirror image also fragments and traumatically alienates the child from 
a previous sense of unity. For Lacan, the mirror stage becomes a general paradigm for 
identity dynamics, where recognition of the Self in the mirror of the Other always entails a 
sense of misrecognition from a previous sense of ‘wholeness’ and unity (Edkins, 1999; 
Lacan, 1985). A move to a Lacan-inspired understanding of identity thus fundamentally 
‘undermines the cohesiveness presumed in the psychological study of the ’self’ (Epstein, 
2011: 328), because the search for the unity of the Self can never be complete. Instead, in 
order to make social relations bearable, our everyday experience is structured by the 
invention of imaginary relations of identification, which seek to stich up the gap between the 
split Self and its image. Destabilising these imaginary relations is one of the core tasks of 
psychoanalysis, and it requires confronting the subject with the repressed gap (Žižek, 2008).3 
 In applying these insights to international relations it is important to clarify the link 
between the individual and the collective levels of analysis. While Lacan developed his 
theory to discuss identity formation at the individual level, social theorists such as Žižek 
(2008) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) began discussing its broader societal implications, 
arguing that discourse analysis should be complemented by an attempt to articulate and 
analyse that which is unsaid or repressed, yet nonetheless directs human behaviour. More 
recently, attempts have been made to introduce the Lacanian theory into IR theory (e.g. 
Edkins, 1999; Epstein, 2011, 2013; Zevnik 2009) to stress, as Epstein puts it, that ‘the 
fundamental alienation is precisely the lack that lies at the heart of identity […] what defeats 
the possibility of a closed, cohesive self’ (Epstein, 2011: 336). Yet, because states are not 
people and ‘have no biological mechanisms’ (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014: 492), 
representations are ‘a key link’ between individual experiences and collective political 
dynamics (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014: 505). Assembled into a discourse, representations 
serve as a mirror – or ‘big Other’ – through which collectives seeks meaning and purpose. 
Thus, by analysing representations, be they textual or visual, we can examine how specific 
                                                
3  Ghandi (2006) draws on ideas of a dislocation and openness of the self to construct a utopic 
‘noncommuniatrian’ community, estranged from Western civilization. 
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images of national Self are constructed and mobilised, drawing on a multitude of actual or 
potential individual experiences, thus creating new conditions of possibility for politics.    
Applying these insights in IR helps us conceptualise how discourses of national Self 
relate to the perceived image of the state by other states, and, in this way, how the 
international serves as ‘the big Other’ vis-à-vis the state. Today, for example, international 
governance rankings, economic indicators and nation brand indexes (see Löwenheim, 2008), 
play a key role in this regard, by presenting the state with ‘mirror’ images through which the 
national Self is reflected. These images can then be mobilised politically to promote a 
privileged image of the national Self. Israeli leaders, for example, use R&D indicators as a 
sign of recognition of an Israeli ‘Start-up Nation’ narrative, inspired by a bestseller with the 
same name (Senor and Singer, 2011).4 The international Other, however, can also destabilise 
discourses of national Self. Whereas stigma management concerns the management of 
deviance in international relations (Adler-Nissen, 2014, see also Zarakol, 2010), 
misrecognition refers to how states cope with sense of a gap between a claimed national Self 
and its representation by the international Other. For instance, when international sanctions or 
shaming articulate an image of the nation that does not resonate with the predominant 
domestic identity markers, they may engender a multitude of individual instantiations of 
misrecognition. Yet, to be politically salient, these individual instantiations have to be 
translated and publically articulated into a collective discourse of misrecognition, expressing 
explicitly a gap between the discourse of national Self and the international image.  
In response to such – discursively constituted – gap or crisis of representation, various 
management techniques can be used to address and mediate international misrecognition, 
thereby (re)creating imaginary relations of unity with the international Other. One of the 
increasingly common ‘gap-stitching’ techniques in international politics is public diplomacy. 
 
                                                
4 E.g. http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechDavos230114.aspx (accessed 10 
August 2017). 
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Managing international misrecognition 
Public diplomacy as national identity management 
 In a poststructuralist reading, diplomacy is the practice of mediation between 
estranged political communities or groups of Self and Others (Der Derian, 1987). On the face 
of it, public diplomacy is engaged in reducing the degree of Otherness. Understood as ‘direct 
communication with foreign publics, with the aim of affecting their thinking, and ultimately, 
that of their government’ (Malone, 1985: 199), public diplomacy can be seen as a de-
radicalising form of foreign policy discourse. Unlike security discourses, where radical 
differentiations present the Other as a threat to the privileged self, public diplomacy 
discourses seem to aspire to inscribe less radical degrees of Otherness, with a view to winning 
the hearts and minds of foreign populations (Fitzpatrick, 2009: 1). Indeed, this projection of 
national identity through public diplomacy appears – to its proponents at least – to be an 
effective way to communicate national interests; one that lacks the ‘chauvinistic’ and 
‘antagonistic’ elements of more reactionary forms of nationalism (Van Ham, 2001). 
 More specifically, public diplomacy draws on mundane similarities, where the 
national and the international are not in opposition, but work in concert. Arguably, the 
purpose of public diplomacy is to ‘maintain smooth international relationships’ (Melissen, 
2005: 21, for a discussion of digital diplomacy, see Bjola and Holmes eds. 2015). While 
accepting that identities are fragile and unstable, nation-branding professionals and public 
diplomacy consultants promise to help correct foreign misunderstandings and prejudices by 
constructing and projecting a distinct and positive national identity, consciously highlighting 
certain meanings and myths while ignoring others (Anholt, 2002; Aroncsyk, 2013; Hocking, 
2005; Melissen, 2005). The underlying assumption in much of public diplomacy theory and 
practice is that such campaigns work by showing the best version of the national Self. Public 
diplomacy – and its promise of closing the gap between how the world sees the state and the 
state’s own representation of itself – can be understood as a strategy. One that articulates a 
fantasy of unity between the estranged Self and the world by presenting a positive Self 
without a concrete devalued Other. However, there is little evidence to suggest that this has 
ever succeeded. In fact, such public diplomacy may even further radicalise foreign publics 
against the state (Khatib et al 2012). 
 Moreover, public diplomacy does not just market a particular version of the national 
image abroad but also engages in a difficult and contentious domestic struggle to stabilise a 
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particular version of national identity. In this process, according to critics such as Browning, 
new public diplomacy and nation branding, tend to turn national identity into 
‘decontextualised, depoliticised and dehistoricised montages’ (Browning, 2013: 12). As 
Graan observes, the assumption that countries must be marketable to international consumer 
publics ‘authorises a space of state governance concerned with regulating public space, 
public behaviour, and representational discourse on the nation’ (Graan, 2013: 165). Public 
diplomacy thus creates subjects in order to justify or develop policies. For instance, China’s 
nation-branding exercises ‘are part and parcel of Beijing’s nation building exercises to instil 
loyalty to the Party brand and strengthen Beijing’s own legitimacy, amongst both its 
domestic population and international audience’ (Barr, 2012: 81). Public diplomacy, in other 
words, is as much intended for internal consumption as it is directed at foreign publics 
(Melissen, 2005: 13). This is also the case in Israel, where the ‘Presenting Israel’ campaign 
led to much debate among Israelis about its purpose and the nature of Israeli identity, 
primarily due to the technique it employed: humour. Indeed, it is impossible to understand 
the impact of the campaign and how it worked discursively and visually, without taking its 
use of humour into account.  
 
Humour as a coping mechanism 
 In the social and human sciences, humour has for many decades been the subject of 
critical and systematic inquiries. Here, humour is often seen as essential to the construction of 
identities, and it plays a central role in maintaining and sometimes disrupting a social order. 
Humour can serve both to politicise and depoliticise particular social relations (Kuipers, 
2005). Within IR scholarship, however, humour has not received much attention, with a few, 
but notable exceptions: Wedeen (2002) has provided a superb analysis of the subversive 
function of humour in Assad’s Syria, while other IR scholars have discussed humour in the 
context of postcolonialism (Krishna, 1993), conflict resolution (Kuusisto, 2009) and pop 
culture (Payne, 2017). Yet humour is still largely seen as an epiphenomenon in world 
politics, one that is not relevant to issues of war and peace. We wish to argue, however, that 
humour is a central coping mechanism when it comes to handling international 
misrecognition. 
 The most fundamental definition of humour, proposed by Emmanuel Kant is that it 
arises out of incongruities (Morreall, 2011: 17). More specifically, its mechanism is an 
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unexpected, often sudden clash, ‘which can be between real and unreal (absurd humour), 
between taboo and non-taboo (e.g. sexual humour, toilet humour, aggressive humour), or 
between the gruesome and the innocent, the banal, or even the cheerful’ (Kuipers, 2005: 
456). As a result, ‘there is something odd, abnormal or out of place’ in a humorous situation, 
‘which we enjoy in some way’ (Morreall, 2005: 68). In other words, humour occurs when 
two ideas or events, that are usually considered incompatible, are juxtaposed, shifting in 
perspective from seriousness to play (Kuipers, 2008). Humour, then, plays on the multiple 
possibilities within an utterance or concept.  
 Humour has a specific semantic domain of ambiguity that gives its particular political 
power. Moreover, precisely because of its play with meanings, humour can generate a strong 
sense of self-identity (as a member of an inclusive, ‘us’ group) resting on the fact that 
‘sometimes people just don’t get it’ (Hutcheon, 1994). This combination of semantic 
ambiguity and insider-knowledge is particularly apparent when states object to being 
ridiculed internationally. For instance, Kazakhstan complained against the mockumentary 
comedy film, Borat, starring a fictitious Kazakh journalist who travels through the United 
States, and sought to rehabilitate its international image by publishing advertisements in The 
New York Times and Foreign Affairs. However, the Kazakh government ended up reinforcing 
the image of a tragi-comic repressive state (Schatz, 2008: 58). The Kazakh government was 
up against the powerful semantics of humour, making it extremely difficult for it to protest 
against defamation.  
 In using humour studies to understand how states cope with misrecognition, two 
theories seem particularly relevant: release and superiority theory. Within the fields of 
psychology and psychoanalysis, humour is typically understood as a means to release 
stress/tension and nervous energy (see Zijderveld, 1968). According to ‘release’ theorists, the 
pleasure of laughter is rooted in relief from anxieties and fears. In The Joke and Its Relation 
to the Unconscious (1903), Freud claimed that funniness was caused by the economic release 
or avoided expenditure of psychic energies stemming from unconscious repression. Humour 
thus gives people the opportunity to subvert a power they cannot otherwise combat and to 
release repressed sensibilities. According to release theory, humour allows taboo subjects, 
thoughts and feelings to be expressed in culturally permissible ways and thus create 
‘catharsis’ and ‘anti-shame’ affects (Scheff, quoted in Kuipers 2008: 371). 
 The second perspective represents humour as a symbolic victory over the victim or 
target of humour. ‘Superiority’ or ‘disparagement’ theorists consider humour to be a means 
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by which individuals and groups mark their superior position vis-à-vis a subject. Often 
attributed to Thomas Hobbes, this understanding of humour relates ‘laughter to power and 
traced the origins and purposes of laughter to social rivalry’, by laughing, we establish ‘some 
eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others’ (Boskin and Dorinson 
quoted in Kuipers, 2008: 375). In this sense, collectively, humour helps to re-draw the 
boundaries of a political community. Indeed, studies of national identity have long 
emphasised the identity- and solidarity-building functions of humour. 
 However, the play with taboos can also allow for self-critique, i.e. a reversed 
superiority argument. For example, Wang and Hallquist (2011) examine how the TV shows 
South Park and The Daily Show systemically depict China as mysterious, authoritarian and 
threatening, mimicking the general media coverage of China in the US. However, in doing 
so, the shows also mock Americans’ cultural ignorance about China and their paranoia of its 
rise. As the authors conclude, the shows invite their viewers to be reflective of their existing 
perceptions on China (Wang and Hallquist, 2011). As such, humour can also play a 
subversive or emancipatory role, allowing for ‘direct or indirect critique of an established 
idea, order or practice’ (Payne, 2017: 7). In holding up a mirror, humour can make people 
laugh at themselves. Yet, as the next part will show, the use of humour in the ‘Presenting 
Israel’ campaign does not seek to enable experimentation or self-critique by making Israeli 
laugh of themselves, but rather – in a combination of release and superiority – works to 
circumvent international criticism and thus re-legitimise existing policies domestically.  
 
Israel’s international misrecognition and its techniques of mediation   
 The search for international recognition has always been high on the agenda of 
Israel’s foreign policy (Bialer, 2002). Since the early days of Zionism, Israeli public 
institutions have been engaged in various international public awareness activities, often 
referred to as Hasbara (Hebrew for ‘explanation’ or making reasonable or sensible) on behalf 
of the state (Toledano and Mckie, 2013). Despite the desire for recognition, Israel has also, 
somewhat paradoxically, been characterised by a tendency to ‘discount’ international opinion 
and institutions (Adler, 2013). Historically, its diplomacy has been suspicious of the 
international community and unilateralist (Peri, 1993). This, together with the widely shared 
belief that the world would stay biased against Israel regardless of its actions (Gilboa, 2006), 
helps to explain why public diplomacy has largely been neglected in the past. Within recent 
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years, however, this has changed, and as this section shall show, the search for international 
recognition has become central to Israel’s foreign policy focusing on public diplomacy 
 
Israel’s national identity  
 Israel is ‘deeply divided along religious, ethnic and political lines’ (Waxman 2006, 2), 
and its narratives of national Self are ripe with internal tensions. From the beginning, official 
state attempts were made to forge a common Israeli identity through the ‘melting pot’ 
doctrine, encouraging immigrants, and particularly the Mizrahi Jews, to shed their diasporic 
identity and adopt the cultural values developed by Western Ashkenazi immigrants (e.g. 
Toledano and Mckie, 2013). However, scholars have long noticed the failure of this process, 
and with immigration from the former USSR and Ethiopia in the 1990s, together with the 
persistent exclusion of the Arab-Israeli narratives from the national Self, a common Israeli 
identity has never stabilised. Nonetheless, among the Jewish-Israeli population that holds the 
reins of power within the state, three identity markers are commonly identified as central: 
Israel as a security provider, Israel as Jewish, and Israel as a democracy  (Lupovici, 2012).  
 First, Israel is depicted as a security provider for its citizens, able to deter its enemies. 
This identity marker is associated with the traumas of life in diaspora and the Israeli people’s 
sense of victimhood, the existential insecurities of a persistent state of war, and a collective 
‘siege mentality’ (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Barnett, 2013; Peri, 1993; Waltzer, 2013). 
Second, while the majority of the Israeli population is not religious, Jewishness is commonly 
articulated as being ‘fundamental’ to Israeli identity, yet understood more in nationalist than 
religious terms.5 Third, the idea that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East has 
become integral to Israeli discourses of Self (Lupovici, 2012; Sucharov, 2005; Waxman, 
2006), often expressed publically through phrases such as ‘villa in the jungle’.6 Needless to 
say, these narratives of Israeli identity are highly politicised and contested, subject to constant 
academic and popular debates.  
 For example, being a security provider and defending the border between the inside 
and the outside, is an inherent marker of any sovereign state. In Israel, however, the 
                                                
5 On the distinction between Judaism and Jewishness, see Cooper (2015). 
6 See https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/jewish-majority-israel-villa-in-the-jungle 
(accessed 8 December 2016). 
15 
boundaries between outside and the inside were always blurred due to the inclusion of non-
Israeli Jews from around the globe, and the exclusion of the Israeli non-Jews from the 
parameters of the national Self. Moreover, being a Jewish state often clashes with being 
democratic one due to the status of the Arab minority and the ongoing policies in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, leading some some to argue that Israel’s democratic identity 
is in ‘recession’ (Chazan, 2013; Lupovici, 2012).7 As if to compensate for the demise of the 
democracy marker, with the stagnating peace process, a new marker of identity has emerged 
in recent years – as Israeli elites have begun to self-identify as a ‘Start-Up Nation’.  
 Despite these tensions, in many periods of its modern history Israel managed to 
maintain a relatively stable and mostly positive international image, 8 ‘seen by most in the 
world with benevolent eyes: as ‘David’ confronting ‘Goliath’’ (Adler, 2013: 3). However, 
with the stagnation of the peace process, the expansion of West Bank settlements, the 
construction of ‘the separation wall’, and Israel’s wars in Lebanon and Gaza (e.g. Marzano, 
2013) in the aftermath of the second intifada, ‘Israel’s reputation abroad has dramatically 
deteriorated’ (Gilboa, 2006: 715). With the military occupation of the West Bank and the 
blockade of the Gaza Strip, accusations of grave human rights and international law 
violations, global opinion polls showed that Israel’s public image became increasingly 
negative (see Gilboa, 2006: 731-735; Greenfield, 2012). Particularly in Europe, where the 
EU’s 2003 Eurobarometer revealed that Israel was perceived as the biggest threat to peace in 
the world by European populations (EC, 2003: 78).  
 An example of the link between international criticism and national identity 
destabilisation can be seen in the case of the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions 
movement (BDS). Emerging in 2005 as a coalition of 170 organisations claiming to represent 
Palestinian interests, the BDS movement attempts to delegitimise Israel by branding it as a 
violent apartheid state. The movement frequently appeals to the international community to 
put pressure on Israel, with the aim of ending the occupation, dismantling the separation wall, 
grating the right of return to Palestinian refugees etc. (Ananth, 2013). These discourses 
clearly negate the three traditional markers of Israeli identity: The demands to end to 
                                                
7 Arguably, these tensions make Israel an ‘overburdened’ polity (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989) and place Israel in 
a ‘triangle dilemma’, where it ‘can be any two of the following – a democracy, an occupier of the territories  
[i.e. ‘security provider’], or a Jewish state – but not all three at the same time’ (Lupovici, 2012: 825).  
8 Particularly due to the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the Oslo agreement with the Palestinian 
Authority. 
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occupation by dismantling the separation wall challenges Israel’s self-perception as a security 
provider, since the occupation, according to Israeli policy makers, was initiated for national 
security reasons. The call to end colonialism entails the right of return of Palestinian 
refugees, which challenges the Jewish marker of the Israeli identity. Invoking the term 
apartheid challenges Israel’s democratic identity and its privileged differentiation from the 
non-democratic Arab Other.   
 
Israel’s New Public Diplomacy 
 The rapid deterioration of Israel’s image has not gone unnoticed within Israel and 
insufficient attention to public diplomacy has increasingly been identified as the cause. The 
2002 annual State Comptroller report (2002: 9-11) pointed to ‘severe deficiencies’ in Israeli 
public diplomacy and the government was reproached by Israeli academics for ‘lack of 
awareness and understanding of the critical role public diplomacy plays in contemporary 
international relations (Gilboa, 2006: 716). When the 2007 State Comptroller report, 
published after the second Lebanese war, pointed out that many PR disasters could have been 
avoided (State Comptroller, 2007: 451-2), the Israeli government began introducing major 
reforms to its ‘Hasbara’ apparatus (Greenfield, 2012).  
 In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) became responsible for nation 
branding and a British consulting firm was hired to develop Israel’s brand strategy. 
According to the MFA’s executive director, the strategy was meant to close ‘the unbearable 
gap between our image abroad and who we really are’ (Shilo, 2008) by promoting narratives 
of the Israeli ‘special energy’, ‘entrepreneurial seal’ and ‘vibrant diversity’ (Acanchi, 2008). 
In 2009, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs (MPDDA) was established, 
along with a national ‘Hasbara’ coordination headquarters, as part of the Prime Minister’s 
office. While the MFA was still in charge of classic public diplomacy and nation branding, 
the MPDDA was to develop a strategy for an informal ‘people’s diplomacy’. By empowering 
Israeli citizens travelling abroad with information and advocacy skills, this peer-to-peer 
diplomacy aimed to weaken the delegitimisation campaign through counter-networks of pro-
Israel advocates (Knesset Research and Information, 2010). 
 MPDDA’s survey of 60,000 people in Israel and in the diaspora revealed that over 90 
per cent of the respondents agreed with statements such as ‘Israel is not perceived correctly in 
the world’ and it is ‘important for me to represent Israel abroad and I am willing to take an 
17 
active part in it’ (Attias, 2012: 476). Backed by these results, the campaign ‘Presenting Israel’ 
was launched in 2010, with the aim of ‘building Israel’s modern public diplomacy ability 
through its citizens and diasporas’ (Attias, 2012: 477). Unlike the 2008 nation branding 
initiative, the campaign focused on mobilising ‘the communication potential’ of Israeli 
citizens (Attias, 2012: 474). Explaining the project, the Minister of Public Diplomacy and 
Diaspora Affairs, Yuli Edelstien argued that in order to fight demonisation and 
delegitimisation, the ministry had to ‘bring back the human dimension of Israeli faces […] by 
creating and encouraging direct communication, without governmental mediation, between 
our ‘explainers’ and the peoples of the world’ (Pyoterkovsky 2010).   
 Our analysis of the campaign builds on a range of written sources, including protocols 
and notes from parliamentary committees, reports by governmental agencies, think tank 
papers, academic publications and Israeli and foreign media coverage of the ‘Presenting 
Israel’ campaign. Moreover, we interviewed two senior officials who were responsible for 
the campaign. We used the Way Back Machine Internet archives (https://archive.org/web/) to 
access an archived version of the website of the campaign (as the site has been closed down 
and the MPDDA no longer exists). The campaign videos were accessed through the 
campaign’s channel on YouTube. All non-English sources were translated by us. For 
illustrative purposes, we reproduce a few screenshots from the campaign (see Figure 1-4).9 
 
‘Presenting Israel’: Humour, visual imagery and the representation of 
Others 
 To mobilize Israeli citizens, Israel's Government Advertising Agency produced three 
video clips in English, French and Spanish that used humour to parody how the global media 
portrays Israel. Between 2010-2012, the three clips were broadcast on national Israeli 
television accompanied by radio jingles and printed press advertisements. The videos 
depicted how the foreign media portrayed Israel as a primitive and war-mongering state and 
called on Israeli citizens to become active in changing this image abroad. For that purpose an 
accompanying website was established, telling Israelis how the world looked at Israel and 
                                                
9 These reproductions are very partial and for non-commercial research purposes only as per the ‘fair dealing’ 
doctrine’. 
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what they should do. The mix of genres and platforms rendered the campaign as much visual 
as textual. 
 The first video clip (Figure 1), and perhaps the most emblematic and widely 
remembered, presents itself as a typical BBC documentary, infused with Orientalist audio-
visual motives. A caravan of camels is passing through a beautiful desert landscape with a 
rising red sun in the background. A reporter with a pronounced British accent appears, 
wearing a khaki coloured outfit. He describes the camel as ‘the typical Israeli animal, used by 
the Israelis to travel from place to place in the desert where they live. It is the means of 
transport for water, merchandise and ammunition. It is even used by the Israeli cavalry’ 
(Masbirim’s channel, 2010a). The music then changes to an upbeat tune and a voiceover in 
Hebrew says: ‘Are you tired of seeing how we are represented in the world? You can change 
the image. Visit the website of the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, and 
receive information about the right advocacy [hasbara nekhona]. Explaining [masbirim] 
Israel, you can also do it!’. 
 
Figure 1: ‘British’ video (source: screenshot from Masbirim’s channel, 2010a) 
 
 A similar leitmotif is apparent in the second video. In what appears as a ‘breaking 
news’ bulletin, a French news anchor reports gravely (in French with Hebrew subtitles): ‘We 
are now receiving reports that in recent hours the sounds of war can be heard throughout 
Israel. Our correspondent reports gunfire and loud explosions that can be heard everywhere’. 
However, the images that are displayed on the screen in the background, as all Israeli viewers 
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will immediately recognise, are images of the Israeli Independence Day celebrations 
featuring fireworks, aerobatics planes, official ceremonies and street parties.  
 
Figure 2: The ‘French’ video (source: screenshot from Masbirim’s channel, 2010b)  
 Finally, in the third video, a Spanish-speaking lifestyle reporter strolls through a 
sunny park amongst barbecuing Israelis, commenting enthusiastically on Israeli everyday 
life: ‘In Israel technology is under-developed, and in most houses there is neither electricity 
nor cooking gas. That is why the Israelis still use ancient cooking methods, like scorching 
meet on an open fire, referred to as Mangal [barbeque in Hebrew] by the locals. May I? [one 
local offers her a skewer, which she takes a bite from, declaring with a smile:] ‘Mmm... 
primitive but delicious!’. 
 
Figure 3: The ‘Spanish’ video (source: screenshot from Masbirim’s channel, 2010c) 
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The politics of representation 
 The videos are clearly parodies mimicking the style of another genre – the travel 
documentary or the news broadcast – exaggerating these formats to mock the stylistic habits 
of foreign media such as the BBC or TV5Monde (see Twark, 2007: 21). The displayed 
incongruity between Israeli identity markers and the claims in the videos generate humourous 
clashes through combinations of inconsistent audio-visual elements – the real and the unreal. 
As such, the videos play with the widespread notion of misrepresentation by the European 
Other. As explained by one of the ministry officials behind the campaign, the strategy was to 
mobilise Israeli citizens by provoking them into action, based on research among 60,000 
individuals that aimed to examine ‘what pains them in the gut’ (Petah Tikva, 07.01.2016, 
interview). According to the research, these videos were seen as an ‘effective call to action’ 
(Attias, 2012: 477), serving the aim of the campaign of mobilising individual actions through 
collective articulations of misrecognition.  
 Psychoanalysts and surrealist painters often use the strategy of generating individual 
responses such as irritation through visual incongruous symbolic staging. In this process of 
over-identification, the strategic visual staging provokes the viewer by ‘embracing 
simultaneously, within the same space, the multitude of inconsistent […] elements’ (Žižek, 
2006: 56) from which subjectivity is constituted. That way, the fictitious visual incongruity 
confronts the viewer with that which is repressed and cannot be articulated linguistically, nor 
enacted otherwise in real life. By playing with the visual representation of the unarticulated, 
the viewers are provoked to identify with the underlying elements, which unconsciously 
guide subjective perception (Žižek, 2006). The videos provide a telling example of this 
process of incongruous strategic staging: According to officials in the MPPDA, the foreign 
media represents a threat to Israel’s international image, by being persistently biased in their 
representation of Israel (Interview, Jerusalem, 03/01/2016). In the videos, the representation 
of foreign media articulates a collective discourse of international misrecognition, by turning 
Israel’s dominant identity markers around. 
 For example, the British BBC-style reporter’s fictitious depiction of Israel confronts 
the narrative of Israel as a technologically advanced security provider. It uses a belittling 
Orientalist image where Israel is depicted as a backward place, where camels are still used by 
‘the Israeli cavalry’. Similarly, the French ‘breaking news’ video clip generates humourous 
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incongruity by misrecognising peaceful and festive Independence Day celebrations for 
violence and war, tapping into a wider concern amongst the public and policymakers that 
Israel is associated with war and terror. Finally, the incongruity of the Spanish video is 
created by exoticising a banal leisure activity, barbecuing, and presenting this way of 
preparing food as an indication of Israel being a primitive and backward place without 
modern kitchens, thereby negating the ‘Start-Up Nation’ narrative. Doing so, the videos draw 
on a range of ambiguous, often unspoken, individual experiences of misrecognition and 
assemble them into one collective discursive formation. Once articulated publically, this 
discourse opens up new possibilities for politics, privileging the circumvention of 
international criticism.  
 This articulation of misrecognition is strategic and political, and does not necessarily 
represent how Israelis really feel. Instead, there is a gap between representations and that 
which they seek to represent and in this gap, the politics of representation – and choices of 
inclusion and exclusion – are located. For example, much of drive for the campaign came 
from the minister’s search for a purpose and legitimacy of a newly established ministry. As 
argued by Caspi (2010), the campaign was crucial to the minister’s self-promotion: ‘Without 
‘Presenting Israel’, there is a doubt whether many would have known that [the MPDDA] 
exists.’ However, as noted by an editorial in Haaretz (2010), the campaign ‘must not be 
viewed just as a gimmick, or an attempt to justify the unnecessary existence of the […] 
Ministry. Instead, it represents how the government wants its citizens to understand their 
country and represent it to the world’. Indeed, at the end of each video, viewers were 
encouraged to visit the campaign’s newly developed website and learn more about how they 
could help in improving Israel’s image abroad. Once launched, the campaign, and its 
representations of the Israeli Self and its Others, became politically salient regardless of the 
original motivations behind it. 
 The political significance of these representations is perhaps most evident in a section 
of the website called ‘Myth vs. Reality’. While the Israel-Palestine conflict is commonly seen 
as central to Israel’s representation abroad, according to Edelstein, the campaign seeks to 
‘stop apologising’ and to advocate ‘beyond the conflict’ (The Committee for Immigration, 
Absorption and Diaspora Affairs, 2012). Instead, the campaign website engages with the 
international criticism by staging certain ‘myths’. These myths are based on a consensus 
about how Israel is seen abroad, which has developed within various Israeli ministries 
(Interview, Jerusalem, 03/01/2016). For example, the myth that ‘Israel is a desert and they all 
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ride camels’, ‘your women wear kaffiyehs’; and that in general, Israel is a religious and 
primitive military dictatorship that ‘really doesn’t want peace’. The campaign website then 
carefully refutes these ‘myths’ by pointing out that Israel is actually a secular and 
technologically advanced democracy and reminds the reader about Israel’s achievements in 
technology, agriculture, medicine, etc. (Ministry of Public Diplomacy & Diaspora Affairs, 
2010a). Overall, the website affirms positive aspects of Israeli identity, beefed up with stock 
photos of Israeli cuisine and nature (Figure 4). 
 
   
Figure 4: Screenshot from the campaign website. Source: Ministry of Public Diplomacy & 
Diaspora Affairs, 2010  
 Engaging more directly with the international criticism, the website also explains that 
is a ‘myth’ that the UNSC Resolution 242 requires Israel to return to the 1967 borders since 
its demand for withdrawal from the occupied territories never specified where the border 
should be. Similarly, it is a ‘myth’ that ‘[m]illions of Palestinian refugees are not allowed to 
return to Israel’, since their numbers are much lower and many of them were not native to the 
land to begin with. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the website also claims that it is 
a ‘myth’ that ‘[t]here’s no peace because of the settlements’ because the conflict does not 
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originate ‘in the size of the state but in its very existence’. The citizen-diplomat is then 
encouraged to remind foreigners that Israel evacuated some settlements in 2005, but it was 
the Palestinians who chose to continue the violence (Ministry of Public Diplomacy & 
Diaspora Affairs, 2010a). In a section called ‘Israel and the Arab world’ the website further 
explains that ‘the settlements reestablish historical Jewish settlements, and do not uproot 
Arab residents in the process’. Arguably then, the settlements do not violate international 
laws, such as article 49 of the Geneva Convention, and the website even lists the biblical 
names of several Palestinian towns and villages to illustrate that ‘Arab towns […] were 
founded over ancient Jewish towns’ (Ministry of Public Diplomacy & Diaspora Affairs, 
2010b).  
 Evidently, these narratives are extremely controversial, not only abroad, but also 
within Israel, where some observers note that ‘under the guise of training citizens as 
explainers [the campaign] tries to engineer a broad consensus around hawkish and 
nationalistic positions’ (Caspi, 2010). As argued by an Haaretz editorial, the campaign 
‘reveals the worldview of Benjamin Netanyahu's government: limitless self-righteousness, 
eternal hostility toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, a view of Palestinians as invaders and 
inciters, and commitment to developing the West Bank settlements’ (Haaretz, 2010). The 
‘Peace Now’ movement demanded that the Israeli Prime Minister put a stop to the campaign 
altogether because ‘Israel's positions as presented on this site reflect an extreme rightwing 
ideology’ contradicting the two-state solution (Ynet, 2010). Indeed, the campaign silences 
Israel’s own complex and contradictory identity narratives, especially those of the Arab-
Israeli and the secular left, overwriting religious and political divides. Instead, the Israeli 
citizen-diplomat is constituted in a homogenous and morally superior subject position, where 
‘the starting point is that we are Ok. Now we just need to explain it’ (Mendel, 2010). 
 Armed with this narrative, the section called ‘Tips for the Novice Public Diplomat’ 
guides citizen-diplomats to ‘first listen, then talk’, constantly maintain eye contact, while 
emphasising that ‘body language is just as important as verbal content’. Citizen-diplomats are 
encouraged to: ‘Tell your own personal story […]. After all, and before all else, we’re all 
human beings’. When travelling abroad and meeting foreigners, one should use humour and 
personal examples, and even ‘carry around pictures from home to get your message across’ 
(Ministry of Public Diplomacy & Diaspora Affairs, 2010c). Seeking to mobilise the 
credibility of subjective everyday experiences of ordinary Israelis and channel it through state 
endorsed narratives, this strategy resembles the promotion of Israel – and particularly Tel 
24 
Aviv – as gay-friendly. Criticized as ‘homonationalism’ (Puar, 2013) and ‘pinkwashing’ 
(Schulman, 2012), this strategy appeals to Western ideas of tolerance and pluralism, while 
drawing attention away from Israel’s controversial policies. Citizen participation is central to 
this strategy. As Edelstein explains, ‘[i]n every situation of interpersonal contact with people 
from other countries and with foreign media, […] every Israeli has a duty to tell people about 
Israel and explain the facts’ (Ministry of Public Diplomacy & Diaspora Affairs, 2010d). 
Humour is central to this strategy of fighting international misrecognition. 
 
The role of humour  
 Two interrelated humour dynamics – the aforementioned release and superiority – are 
at work in ‘Presenting Israel’. First, as related in the second part of the article, humour is 
often associated with relief from anxieties and fears. This occurs through the release of 
energies stemming from unconscious repression of issues related to taboos or shame 
(Wedeen, 1999: 121; Zijderveld, 1968). In this reading of the videos, the staging of 
incongruity through over-identification facilitates a release of collective anxieties and fears. 
Indeed, the issue of international criticism have been increasingly depicted in Israel in 
existential terms. A report by the Reut Institute (2010), for example, defined the BDS 
movement as a ‘strategic’ and ‘existential’ threat to Israel. Moreover, influential Israeli 
scholars and politicians began arguing that Israel’s international image, and delegitimisation 
in particular, are issues of national security which the state is ill equipped to handle due to 
insufficient attention to public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2006). The anxious nature of the Israeli 
responses to its deteriorating international image has been described by some as ‘hysteria’ 
(Peled, 2010). From this perspective, the videos were successful exactly because they brought 
about a cathartic relief through humour’s ‘anti-shame’ effect, thus helping Israeli society 
cope with the misrecognition in the mirror of the international Other.  
 Second, a reading drawing on superiority theory, points to the way in which the 
videos stage a symbolic victory in relation to the international Other. This is done by 
degrading the victim of the joke through shaming or ridicule (Kuipers, 2005). In this light, 
the rivalry between the MPDDA and the foreign media over the representation of Israel 
played out in the campaign could be interpreted as an attempt to stage a symbolic victory 
over the international Other. By ridiculing foreign journalists for being ‘stupid’ and 
‘gullible’, the campaign establishes ‘some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the 
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infirmity of others’ (Boskin and Dorinson quoted in Kuipers, 2008: 375). Offended foreign 
journalists claimed that the campaign added fuel to the fire, which not only radicalised 
relations between the Israeli state and the foreign press and, but with Europe as such. In 
response, Minister Edelstien, discarded these claims by saying that he spoke to many 
reporters, and that ‘those who had a sense of humour were not offended’ (Rabinovsky, 2010). 
Precisely in this ambiguity lies the political power of humour: Edelstein is effectively 
claiming that humour has a license to be offensive. By saying the campaign is ‘only joking’, 
Edelstein is using ‘the classic let-out clause when for instance a racist joke falls on 
unreceptive ears’ (Lockyer and Pickering, 2008: 812). The excuse assumes that a joke is just 
a joke and cannot be taken seriously. This is exactly the rhetorical effectiveness on which 
offensive comic discourse relies. 
 However, the semantics of ambiguity can also be seen through a more speculative 
reading of the videos. While the campaign explicitly attempts to ridicule foreign media, its 
underlying subtext could be interpreted as a differentiation from the Arab Other. Whereas the 
exotic, violent and barbaric representations of Israel invoked by the campaign are not shared 
by most Europeans, they do seem to conform to the typical depiction of Arabs in the 
Orientalist discourse within Israel. Here, Arabs are ‘either violent, irrational and evil or 
authentic and antiquated’ (Ras-Krakotskin quoted in Mendel and Ranta, 2016: 10), thus 
serving as a constitutive Other for Israeli identity. In this reading, the negation of ‘myths’ 
presented by the campaign, such as ‘Israel is a desert and they all ride camels’, ‘your women 
wear kaffiyehs’, and ‘Israel is a religious and primitive military dictatorship’, signals to the 
world – and perhaps more importantly to the Israelis themselves – that we are not like the 
Arabs! Thereby, a symbolic victory is established, which would be less legitimate to 
articulate explicitly. Moreover, in the context of the Western/European community and its 
colonial heritage, where Israel is seen as a borderline member, this differentiation from the 
Arab Other expresses Israel’s quest for Western recognition, by signalling: we are like you, 
Europeans!10  
 In sum, though the latter interpretation is speculative, taken together with the other 
elements of the campaign, it illustrates that the usage of humour is neither subversive nor 
                                                
10 This quest for European recognition can be seen more explicitly in the IDF meme ‘What would you do?’ from 
the 2014 Gaza war, See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-gaza-conflict-rockets-
fired-at-the-houses-of-parliament-in-idf-propaganda-image-intended-to-9619380.html (accessed 9 August 
2017). 
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emancipatory, but serves as a depoliticising strategy. Indeed, all three videos humourously 
depict a sense of Israel’s global misrecognition, represented by the growing gap between the 
dominant domestic discourses of national identity and the international image. What appears 
to be mocked in the first place are uninformed Western – or more precisely European – 
journalists. Yet the videos are used to stabilise the Israeli Self through a form of visual play, 
where the exotic (camels), violent (fireworks) and barbaric (outdoor barbecue) become the 
twisted mirrors of dominant Israeli identity markers: security provider, Western democracy 
and Start-Up nation. The only identity marker that appears to be not directly addressed is the 
Jewish identity. However, it could be argued that it is present in the campaign’s tacit play 
with Orientalism, wherein the exotic, violent and barbaric are, in fact, the devalued markers 
of the Arab Other, from which the Israeli Self seeks differentiation.  
 ‘Presenting Israel’ embodies the tension between two discourses – one of being 
‘distinct and better’ and the other of being ‘similar’. On one hand, the campaign presents a 
‘normal’, modern Israel – a feel-good, Western place. Reflecting the desire for recognition 
and release, it appeals to the idea that Israeli identity is compatible with the European, 
seeking to close the gap between the estranged Self and its global image. On the other hand, 
the campaign mocks European misrecognition, and signals that the Israeli Self is somehow 
superior to the misinformed European Other and that there is fundamentally no international 
understanding. Though the campaign ended in 2013, such strategies of parodying Israel’s 
misrecognition are still widely at play. For instance, in a video ridiculing the foreign media 
coverage of the war in Gaza, produced by the Israeli MFA in 2015, a short-sighted foreign 
reporter mistakes Hamas’ underground tunnels for a subway network. The reporter is then 
offered glasses and told: ‘Open your Eyes. Terror rules Gaza’ (Tibon, 2015). Indeed, humour 
reinstates a certain consensus about the Israeli Self-Other relations and thus depoliticises 
Israel’s domestic and foreign policy. However, without changing the policies for which Israel 
is being criticised, this strategy seems to strain rather than assist the mediation of Israel’s 
estrangement.  
     
Conclusion 
This article made three contributions to IR theory. First, we argued that international 
misrecognition can be understood as a gap between a dominant narrative of national Self and 
its image abroad, reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the International Other. Contrary to most 
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approaches to recognition within IR theory, we proposed that misrecognition is inherent in 
any identification process. However, misrecognition only becomes politically salient when it 
is publically articulated as a specific discourse of misrecognition, drawing on a multitude of 
unarticulated and ambiguous individual experiences. Second, the article argued that one of 
the prominent ways in which states cope with a discourse of international misrecognition is 
through public diplomacy. We thus explored public diplomacy as an attempt to stich the gap 
between dominant national identity markers and the state’s global image, creating a fantasy 
of unity between the national Self and the international Other.  
Third, introducing insights from humour theory to IR theory, we explained how 
humour plays a key, albeit often overlooked role in international relations, contributing both 
to maintain and to disrupt social order. Following release theory, humour contributes to ‘gap-
stitching’ strategies by providing relief for anxieties. Humour’s semantic ambiguity can 
promote self-critique and reflection, creating bonds between states. However, as superiority 
theorists explain, humour can also establish a sense of superiority and serve as a political 
weapon to defend a particular version of national Self against criticism from within or 
outside. Since humour is frequently used to articulate what is seldom stated directly – to 
manage misrecognition – and deal with taboos, the analysis of humourous practices provides 
us with important insights into the mechanisms of identification and conflict in international 
relations.  
 More specifically, the article explored how the public diplomacy campaign 
‘Presenting Israel’ mobilised citizen diplomats through videos displaying, in a caricature 
format, how the world sees Israel. By promoting a discourse of international misrecognition, 
the campaign served to reconstruct and repair a damaged and contested image of the Israeli 
Self. It did so by exaggerating stereotypes visually and propelling foreign ‘myths’ about 
Israel that could easily be contradicted, at least by most Israelis. In the face of international 
misrecognition, humour thereby performed anxiety release. However, humour also provided 
a powerful way to circumvent European criticism because any potential serious import 
of ‘Presenting Israel’ could be downplayed with the argument that it was ‘only joking’. The 
campaign fought misrecognition by claiming that Israel was a modern, high-tech, peaceful 
and secular democracy, thereby appealing to sameness and compatibility with European 
Others. Yet, at the same time, by mocking Western criticism, the campaign also presented an 
Israeli Self that appeared to be better than the misinformed European and (possibly) inferior 
Arab Others. In this sense, rather than explaining Israel, the campaign not only reinforced a 
28 
particular version of Israeli identity, it also signalled that there is fundamentally no possibility 
of an international understanding of Israel’s situation. 
At a more general level, this article argued that the attempt to fight misrecognition and 
gain acceptance through public diplomacy does not necessarily ‘smoothen’ national 
characteristics or elude radical differentiations (Browning, 2013). Instead, it can be used to 
shrug off international critics by using humour to cope with anxiety and further radicalise 
international estrangement. This underlines the point that ‘the struggle for recognition may as 
well lead to an entrenchment of existing differences between Self and Other, thus aggravating 
their sense of separateness without giving rise to any shared identity in the process 
(Bartelson, 2013: 120). A deeper understanding of international misrecognition will therefore 
provide invaluable insights to the way in which states cope with international approval or 
criticism, and thus how they construct their national identity and foreign policy.  
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